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ABSTRACT
The objective of the study is to examine audit firm size, the provision of non-audit services 
(NAS) and audit tenure as factors that influence the likelihood that an auditor agrees with 
allowing audit exemption. This study employs a 2 × 2 × 2 within-subject experimental 
design. Respondent auditors were required to evaluate 8 case scenarios. A total of 79 
questionnaires were returned and used for data analysis. General Linear Measurement 
(Repeat Measure) was used to analyse the data. The study found that an audit firm size has 
a significant impact on the likelihood that an auditor agrees with offering audit exemption. 
The larger the size of the firm, the greater is the likelihood of agreeing with allowing audit 
exemption. Therefore, it is suggested that small audit firms (with 5 or fewer employees) 
merge and focus on activities that contribute more added value such as consultancy. In 
so doing, auditors from these firms would be required to improve their knowledge and 
capacity by offering these services and not merely focusing on traditional audit work 
for SMEs. This is because SMEs are known to have limited resources and capacity and thus 
would be expected to have poor internal control. The requirement of a mandatory audit for 
such firms might lead auditors to compromise their independence. Thus, the government 
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and the Malaysian Institute of Accountant (MIA) should help small audit firms to develop 
the necessary knowledge, skills and competencies to perform non-audit services.
Keywords: audit exemption, SMEs, audit firms, firm size, non-audit services, NAS, audit 
tenure.
INTRODUCTION 
Many countries, such as Singapore, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
several other European countries have exempted small companies from annual 
statutory auditing. The experiences of these countries reveal that non-audit services, 
such as consultancy and taxation services, increase when the audit exemption was 
provided. Indirectly, such exemptions encouraged small audit firms to improve 
their knowledge and skills in these areas and, therefore, led to the growth of the 
small audit firms and increases in their revenues.
There are several reasons why SMEs have been offered an audit exemption. The 
'owner- manager' issue highlights that for the majority of small businesses, the 
same individuals serves as the directors and the shareholders. In addition, SMEs 
that are small in size typically lack a strong internal control system, which is a 
necessary prerequisite for an unqualified or a clean audit opinion. Furthermore, 
smaller companies regard conventional audits as a costly activity that provides 
little value added (Collis, 2010; Kamarudin, Abidin, & Smith, 2012).
In Malaysia, the government is pursuing Vision 2020, a plan intended to move 
Malaysia from a middle-income economy to a high-income economy. One of 
the aims of this plan is for companies offering services to improve their service 
quality by offering value-added services. For audit firms, this would mean offering 
innovative services other than the traditional audit services such as consultancy 
and taxation services.
The issue of audit exemption and whether Malaysian regulators are considering 
the move has been reviewed in the past and leaves both the Small and Medium 
Practitioners (SMPs) and SMEs with the question of what the outcome of this 
widely debated issue will be. Among the studies undertaken was a review on the 
requirement of mandatory audit for all companies. In early 2009, the Corporate 
Law Reform Committee issued a recommendation to retain mandatory audit for all 
companies, but power would be given to the regulator to exempt small companies 
from this requirement (SSM, 2009). If audit was deregulated, audit firms which 
concentrated on audit work for small companies would be affected. Thus far, there 
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has been no strong indication or proposal regarding the elimination of mandatory 
audits. Considering the progress made in other countries in audit deregulation, 
including in neighbouring Singapore, the auditing industry in Malaysia will remain 
status quo until policymakers perceive a need to change the regulations on statutory 
audits. Md. Ali, Sahdan, Harun Rasit, and Teck (2008) stated that the Malaysian 
auditing industry is "intertwined" with the dynamics of the political and socio-
economic context. Culture represents another potential influence on Malaysia's 
accounting and auditing practices. Haniffa (2006) contended that cultural factors 
were a prominent factor, as the traditions of a nation are instilled in its people, and 
this could explain "why things are the way they are".
Little research has been conducted to evaluate the role of small and medium 
practices (SMPs) as 'expert advisors' to support the business activities of small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) over and above providing a statutory audit. These 
circumstances have led to conflict because auditors are attempting to maintain 
their professional standards while simultaneously considering the wishes of their 
clients (Koo & Sim, 1999).
The potential advantages of audit deregulation would include allowing SMPs to 
focus their resources on developing their capacities and professional capabilities in 
niche areas other than statutory auditing to serve the heterogeneous SMEs segment. 
SMPs with the ability to provide SMEs with a broad range of business consultancy 
services and expand these services beyond the traditional mandatory audit work 
will spur growth in both entities. Relationship building between the SMEs and 
SMPs is considered crucial in the long run (Abang, 2013; Haron, Ismail, Yahya, 
Khalid, & Ganesan, 2010). There is a distinction between SMEs (non-listed) 
and publicly listed companies. Publicly listed firms face scrutiny from stock 
exchanges, regulators and market participants, and they are characterised by the 
separation of ownership and control. SMEs, in contrast, are much less regulated. 
The disposition of their agency problems is different as they are less exposed 
to market forces, publicity, and litigation and they operate in a much less regulated 
environment. Due to differences in market dynamics, there are different market 
segments for audit services for listed and large companies and those for SMEs. 
Requiring statutory audits of SMEs appears to be questionable based on the 
characteristics of SMEs and SMPs. As Tabone and Baldacchino (2003, p. 388) 
explained, 'the conventional focus when evaluating the need for a statutory audit 
requirement is the economic size of the company'. Limited research has been 
conducted to evaluate audit firms' role as 'expert advisors' providing business 
support services to SMEs over and above statutory audits. This situation generates 
conflict because auditors attempt to maintain their professional standards while 
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simultaneously considering the wishes of their clients (Koo & Sim, 1999). As 
Langli and Svanström (2013, p. 7) affirmed, 'the differences that exist between 
private and public firms are so large that we cannot rely on findings for public 
firms without careful consideration when we want to understand auditing in 
private firms, whether auditing is statutory or not.'
In recent decades, various studies such as Abu Bakar and Ahmad (2009); 
Amake and Okafor (2012); Hariri (2009); Shockley (1981) were conducted on 
auditing and the perception of auditor independence. These studies also examined 
independence issues based on a variety of respondents, ranging from the preparers 
and users of financial statements to cross-cultural studies on perceptions of the 
auditor  independence. Furthermore, scholars had examined the various factors 
that influence the perceived independence issue and also obtained mixed findings. 
To our knowledge, very few empirical studies have been conducted on Malaysia to 
examine the factors leading to auditors' perceptions of allowing audit exemptions. 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to close the gap by examining auditor's perceptions 
regarding audit exemption. Small businesses face constraints with respect to their 
internal control systems that will affect the auditor's opinion. Thus, if auditors 
were asked to issue an audit opinion on the company's financial statements, 
this would affect the auditor's independence. Thus, this study regards agreement 
with the proposition of providing an audit exemption for SMEs as indicating that 
the auditors would be more independent in performing their audit work. 
The lack of literature on auditing SMEs in the Malaysian context entails a gap in 
the body of knowledge regarding the need for an audit exemption for SMEs from 
an SMP perspective. Furthermore, this study represents an important contribution 
because Malaysia is the only Asian country that requires all private companies, 
regardless of size, to have annual audits of their accounts annually (Salleh, Che 
Rose, Kumar, & Jaafar, 2008a). Therefore, the objective of this research is to 
investigate the factors influencing the likelihood that auditors will agree to an 
audit exemption for SMEs using an experimental research design. This study will 
specifically examine audit firm size; the provision of NAS; and the length of 
the relationship between audit firms and their clients (audit tenure) and the effects 
of these factors on the likelihood of an auditor agreeing with providing an audit 
exemption. The next section will present the literature review and hypothesis 
development include the types of companies and regulations in Malaysia, the 
background of audit exemption and the relationship between SMEs and auditing.
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
SMEs in Malaysia
In Malaysia, section 174 of the Companies Act of 1965 states that all registered 
companies, regardless of size, type of business, or whether the company is public 
or private, must have their  financial  statements  audited  on  an  annual  basis. 
The financial statements must be prepared in accordance with the accounting 
standards approved by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) and 
the provisions of the Companies Act of 1965 and audited by an approved auditor. 
The types of companies in Malaysia are Public Listed, Non-Public Listed, Private 
Limited and Exempt Private Companies. Other than Exempt Private Companies, 
all companies must file audited accounts with the Companies Commission of 
Malaysia (CCM).
In Malaysia, SMEs in the manufacturing sector are defined as enterprises with 
annual sales turnover of no more than RM50 million or employing no more than 
200 workers, whereas in the services and other sectors, the company must have 
annual sales turnover below RM20 million or employ no more than 75 workers. 
According to Economic Census 2011, the types of legal status of SMEs are 
namely: (i) Individual Proprietorship (71%), (ii) Partnership (8.5%), (iii) Private 
Limited Company (18.4%), and (iv) Others (2.1%). Private limited companies 
account for the second largest portion of SMEs in Malaysia. As the name suggests, 
a private limited company's shares are privately held by its shareholders and are not 
available to the public. A private limited company, identified by the abbreviation 
'Sdn Bhd' (Sendirian Berhad) at the end of the company's name, is regulated by 
the statutory requirements for companies incorporated under the Companies Act 
of 1965 and thus must have its accounts audited.
Generally, the objective of an audit is to express an opinion on the truth and 
fairness of a company's financial statements in accordance with the requirements 
of the Companies Act of 1965. In other words, the fundamental purpose of an audit 
is to inform shareholders regarding the management of the company. However, 
many private limited companies are owner- or family-managed and small, as 
measured by quantitative criteria such as turnover, net assets and/or the number of 
employees. Typically, the ownership and management of the company's assets are 
vested in the same persons. This leads to the question of whether a mandatory 
annual statutory audit requirement is justified in such circumstances, 'where the 
auditor is merely reporting information already known to the same person acting 
in a different role' (Tabone & Baldacchino, 2003, p. 389). The relevance of a 
mandatory annual statutory audit requirement for SMEs, given their economic 
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size, owner-managed status and costly reporting requirements, has been the subject 
of substantial debate worldwide.
In the year 2002, 91% of audit firms in Malaysia are owned by one or two partners, 
whereas 1% of these firms have more than nine partners (Lee, 2002). Surail, 
Ayoib, and Hariri (2007) concluded that the Malaysian market for audit services 
is competitive and 'the survival of small and medium practitioners hinges on the 
provision of personalized services to clients' (Lee, 2002, p. 16).
In a presentation by Audit Oversight Board Malaysia on November 2014 entitled 
"Sectorial Dialogue with Audit Firms", it can be said that although the number of 
small audit firms with either sole proprietor or with 2–4 partners are decreasing 
in number from 2011 to 2014, it can be seen that they are still the majority of 
audit firms in Malaysia from 2011 to 2014, totalling 81%, 77%, 74% and 74% 
respectively. This can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1
Number and types of audit firms in Malaysia
Profile of audit firms/ No. of Audit Firms
Year
Qty
2011 2012 2013 Half Year 2014
Qty % Qty % Qty % Qty %
Big Firms 10 partners and 
above
6 8 6 9 8 15 8 15
Medium Size 
Firms
5–9 partners 8 11 9 14 6 11 6 12
Small Firms 2–4 partners 48 64 43 64 36 68 35 67
Sole proprietors 13 17 9 13 3 6 3 6
TOTAL 75 100 67 100 53 100 52 100
Source: Audit Oversight Board, 2014. Retreived on 1 December 2015 from http://www.sc.com.my
Background of Audit Exemption
Audit exemption is an apparent issue and has been frequently discussed in the 
auditing industry. The issue has been raised and addressed in many developed 
countries such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand (Kamarudin, et al., 2012). 
Other countries have deregulated audits for SMEs, including Malaysia's neighbour 
Singapore, the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
European Union (EU) countries.
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SMEs have been exempt from mandatory auditing in Australia since 1971. In 
2003, Singapore adopted Australia's stringent model to qualify companies for 
audit exemption (Chan, 2012). Canada and the UK introduced audit exemptions in 
1994. The UK government has made several changes to the qualifying threshold for 
businesses to be exempted from auditing. Most countries have implemented other 
provisions to protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders despite 
the companies satisfying the threshold criteria. In the US, privately owned 
companies are not legally required to conduct audits. In general, audit exemption 
is given to SMEs due to several reasons such as SME's lack of internal control 
system due to the fact that they are managed by a limited number of staff and that 
owners are usually also the managers of the company. Thus, in most of the small 
companies where the shareholders and the directors are the same person, it would 
make auditing meaningless. In addition, audit fees that SMEs would have to pay 
would be a financial burden for the small companies with no benefits in return for 
the company. (Collis, 2010; Kamarudin, et al., 2012; Salleh, Che Rose, Kumar, & 
Jaafar, 2008b)
This issue has never been addressed in regulatory reform despite several fundamental 
surveys and studies conducted by the Corporate Law Reform Committee (CLRC) 
beginning in 2003 (Chan, 2012). In a study conducted by Chung and Narasimhan 
(2001), small companies supported the elimination of mandatory audits and audit 
fees. These small companies believed that an audit exemption would reduce the 
workload of directors and staff involved in the preparation of annual audits. Few 
studies have been conducted on the topic in the Malaysian context. However, 
numerous studies have been performed in countries that have implemented 
deregulation, especially in the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU). 
Studies conducted in the UK offered useful insights for policy makers to effect 
change based on the characteristics of small companies (Beaver & Prince, 2004; 
Collis, 2010; Collis & Jarvis, 2002). A certain revenue threshold for the companies 
that is eligible for exemption from annual audit can be determined.
Chan (2012) noted that the study on audit exemption in Malaysia based on the 
auditors' perceptions is Salleh, et al. (2008a). Salleh, et al. (2008a) examined 
the auditors' perceptions on eliminating mandatory annual audits and found that, 
in general, auditors in Malaysia are opposed to the audit exemption regulation. 
The authors also found that the primary contributors to audit firm revenue were 
audits conducted for SMEs. The authors further found that auditors perceived 
that SMEs derive substantial benefits from having their accounts audited. These 
benefits include fraud detection and improved decision making (Salleh, et al., 
2008a). Collis (2010) contended that it is the management's responsibility to weigh 
the costs and benefits of financial reporting and that it is logical to assume that 
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such decisions are made based on economic rationality. Power (1997, p. 5) stated: 
'Audit is a risk reduction practice'. On this basis, Collis (2010) further explained 
that an audit serves as a mechanism to reduce information risk, inherent risk and 
control risk and, ultimately, agency costs.
Based on previous studies on audits of SMEs, there is no consensus among regulators 
regarding the need for statutory audits of private firms (Langli & Svanström, 
2013). In the US and Japan, private firms operate without any legal requirement to 
disclose financial statements (Arruñada, 2011). The legal requirements for audits 
differ across the EU countries. For example in Denmark, Sweden and Malta, all 
firms are required to prepare audited financial statements, including those with 
no sales, whereas Cyprus, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK only require 
auditing for firms with sales exceeding 7 million euros (Collis, 2010).
Although previous research have concluded factors such as providing non-audit 
services (NAS), the duration of auditor-client relationship (audit tenure), audit 
market competition, the size of audit firm/audit client, the size of audit fee, the 
existence of audit committee, the client's financial condition, gift, discount on 
purchases and nature of conflict can influence perceived auditors' independence. 
This study, however, will focus only on three of those factors which are opined to 
be relatively important factors in influencing auditors' independence: (i) size of 
audit firm; (ii) provision of non-audit services by audit firms to the audit clients, 
and (iii) tenure of audit firms serving the needs of a given client. This is in line 
with the MIA By-Laws which highlighted that threats to independence are caused 
by self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation. These threats 
appeared in many circumstances such as in providing non-audit services, duration 
on auditor-client relationship (audit tenure) and audit firm size. This shows that 
the three factors are perceived to be influential by the regulators. For example, 
the duration of auditor-client relationship or audit tenure expose auditors to not 
familiarity, but also self-interest and self-review threat. In addition, providing non-
audit service may expose auditors to all the possible threats.
Small and Medium Enterprises and Auditing
From a theoretical perspective, the need for auditing concerns Agency Theory 
and Stewardship Theory. Agency Theory concerns companies for which there is a 
separation between ownership and control. To monitor the activities of managers, 
the principal (owner) must be willing to incur monitoring costs (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Stewardship Theory notes that managers hired by the owner must serve the 
interests of the owners (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Thus, management can be 
monitored through the annual accounts, the reliability of which is enhanced by 
Audit Exemption for Small and Medium Enterprises
161
an audit report (Goddard & Masters, 2000). However, in many private limited 
companies in Malaysia, the owner (shareholders) and manager is the same person. 
Prior studies indicated that a statutory audit requirement does not provide much 
value in this context (Kamarudin, et al., 2012; Tabone & Baldacchino, 2003). 
Beaver and Prince (2004) examined management issues among small firms in the 
UK and concluded that the form of ownership that exists in larger organisations, 
which is usually distanced from its management and control, is not found in the 
case of small enterprises. Tabone and Baldacchino (2003) analysed mandatory 
annual statutory audit requirements for owner- managed companies in Malta. 
They concluded that in an "owner-managed" company, statutory audits cannot 
be understood as monitoring in the sense of the traditional agency relationship 
between shareholders and directors because the relationship does not exist.
Chan (2012) and Kamarudin, et al. (2012) found that the financial information 
contained in SMEs' financial reports did not satisfy the requirements of the reports' 
primary users. This suggests that the primary deficiencies of SME financial 
statements are that they were prepared for tax reasons, using out-of-date information 
and with limited disclosure. Therefore, SMEs' financial statements were prepared 
merely to satisfy statutory requirements. Furthermore, the majority of SMEs engage 
in simple business transactions, and non-compliance with mandatory accounting 
standards is prevalent among SMEs (Goddard & Masters, 2000).
As in previous studies, SMEs that do not believe that they benefit from statutory 
audits welcome the implementation of audit exemptions. Kamarudin, et al. (2012) 
observed a significant relationship between the level of acceptance of audit 
exemptions and the perceptions of the value provided by an audit, audit burdens 
and audit costs among SMEs in Malaysia. Further insights from the SMEs include 
the fact that statutory audits are not considered to be of substantial value in the 
Malaysian market, where most companies have them performed for the sake of 
regulatory compliance. Previous research have examined whether the benefits of 
audit outweigh the costs (Collis, 2010; Farrugia & Baldacchino, 2005; Salleh, et 
al., 2008a). For example, the benefits of annual auditing are that it can help to 
detect fraud, value-added services to the companies, assist the management in the 
decision making process, and give confidence to third parties about the financial 
status of the company. In contrast, the audit exemption for SMEs in the UK was 
intended to reduce the burden of compliance for small companies, as for firms 
below a certain size, the costs of auditing outweigh the benefits (Collis, 2010). 
Meanwhile, accountability and internal control within SMEs are often the primary 
concerns associated with audit deregulation. Moreover, the interests of users of 
audited financial statements should always be the priority of companies and be 
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protected. Studies conducted on SMEs in Malaysia regarding their perceptions of 
the fundamental purpose of audits (prepare and publish their financial statements) 
indicate that SMEs generally have audits conducted to satisfy statutory requirements 
(Chan, 2012; Kamarudin, et al., 2012). Most SMEs rely on their accountants 
to satisfy these reporting obligations. In addition to providing auditing services 
to SMEs, SMPs also provide credibility for published accounting information 
among users of financial statements, for example, to facilitate the on-time and 
accurate payment of taxes, thereby avoiding penalties, interest and investigations. 
Furthermore, SMPs also provide advisory services to improve the business 
funding, play a key role in raising finance and capital, improve controls, deter and 
detect material fraud and error, demonstrate good corporate citizenship and other 
ancillary benefits of an audit such as advice regarding the structure and operations 
of systems. Some SME directors do not regard reporting costs as an undue burden. 
SME directors regard tax authorities and the organisation's management and 
lenders as the most important users of audited financial statements.
It is necessary to protect the users of financial statements and creditors. Tabone 
and Baldacchino (2003) reported the significance of a statutory audit requirement 
in the owner- manager context if the audit report is relevant to third parties such 
as bankers and other creditors and tax authorities and if the statutory audit has a 
positive effect on the owner- manager and staff in the form of imposing financial 
discipline (and not particularly for fraud detection or error finding) and providing 
advice in non-audit areas. Banks and lenders require audited financial statements 
as part of the credit assessment process for loan applications and during the loan 
tenure, as well as when deemed necessary (Kamarudin, et al., 2012). Therefore, 
the interests of creditors concerning audit exemption must to be taken into 
consideration. Stringent criteria are imposed in countries such as Canada and 
Australia to protect the interests of stakeholders (Chan, 2012). In addition, SMEs' 
access to finance tends to be determined, more than other factors, by the quality 
of financial information they can produce and the degree to which individuals, 
institutions and governments are willing to take on the risk of financing them 
(ACCA, 2010).
The positions of other stakeholders are vital when considering audit exemption. 
The stakeholders most affected by reforms of audit requirements are the SMPs, 
banking institutions and other third-party users of SMEs' audited financial 
statements (Langli & Svanström, 2013). Regulators need to ensure that procedures 
are in place to protect the minority shareholders and other stakeholders in the 
company. 
Audit Exemption for Small and Medium Enterprises
163
Audit Firm Size
Previous research suggests a positive association between audit firm size with 
auditor independence (Abu Bakar, Abdul Rahman, & Abdul Rashid, 2005; Abu 
Bakar & Ahmad, 2009; DeAngelo, 1981; Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). It has been 
found that larger audit firms has higher auditor's independence as they are often 
considered to be more able to resist pressures from management compared to small 
audit firms. More to the point, it has been argued that certain characteristics of 
small audit practices may increase the impairment of independence, such as having 
the tendency to provide a more personalized mode of service and close relationship 
with the client (Shockley, 1981). It is often recognized that large auditing firms are 
less dependent on any single client who are able to resist client firm pressure as they. 
However, as pointed out by (Goldman & Barlev, 1975), one should not conclude 
that large CPA firms are immune to pressures from their clients. The court cases 
which challenge the assumption that CPA firms acted independently indicate that a 
large CPA firm is no guarantee of its ability to resist pressures from clients, as the 
case with Arthur Andersen and Enron (Abu Bakar & Ahmad, 2009). In Malaysia, 
Salleh, Che Rose, Kumar, and Lu (2007) mentioned that 98.5% of MIA firm 
members are made up of small firms, having one to five partners. Another view 
with regards to the size of audit firms in Malaysia, Abu Bakar and Ahmad (2009), 
mentioned that 91.4% of Malaysian audit firms fall into the category of small firms 
with one to two partners, while medium size audit firms with three to eight partners 
constitute 7.5% of the population of audit firms and the remaining figure of 1.1% 
are of the large size audit firms with more than nine partners. Salleh, et al. (2008a) 
used three factors that are being used in the SMEs definitions to categorize the 
firm size. The factors were paid-up share capital, number of employees and annual 
turnover.  The current study will adopt the measurement for audit firm size based 
on the SMEs criteria to classify services and other sectors by sizes according to 
number of employees. Therefore audit firm sizes are categorised into two, namely 
an audit firm size having less than five employees (micro) and one with more than 
five employees (small/medium).
Non-Audit Services
NAS as defined by Firth (1997) include tax consultancy, system consultancy, 
management advice, international business advice, human resources management 
and investment consultancy. Other than providing audit services, many audit 
firms provide NAS to their audit clients. The joint provision of audit and non-
audit services (NAS) by incumbent auditors has been intensively debated in the 
literature. The AICPA has repeatedly taken the position that independence is not 
necessarily impaired when a CPA performs NAS for his audit clients (Beattie 
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& Fearnley, 2002). However, auditors sometimes provide other services that 
are related to audit that is different from NAS. A study by McKinley, Pany, and 
Reckers (1985) examined whether provision of NAS by audit firm, audit firm type 
and audit firm size would affect bank officers' perceptions of CPA independence, 
the financial statement reliability and their loan decision. Results showed that 
NAS did not affect the recommendations of loan application and the reliability of 
financial statements. Meanwhile the studies by Hariri (2009), Shockley (1981), 
and Abu Bakar and Ahmad (2009) have found that NAS significantly impair audit 
independence. Various measurements of non-audit service is evident from the 
past studies. Earlier research by Shockley (1981) merely measured whether or not 
auditors provide such services to their clients, as indicated in the scenario to be 'yes' 
(Y) or 'no' (N) and Abu Bakar, et al. (2005) who later replicated her research used 
the same measures. In a more recent research, as cited in Hariri (2009), Dopuch, 
King, and Schwartz (2003) segregated his measurement to be "Provide" (disclose, 
not disclose) and "Not Provide", which is similar. The MIA By-Law cut off point 
for non-audit service fee is not to exceed 15% of the audit firm's total revenue, 
however the MIA By-Law does not state a maximum limit for NAS received from 
a single client. However this study defines non-audit service as 'present' or 'absent', 
that is the current study will segregate the provision of NAS to its clients into two 
levels, either 'Provide NAS'or 'Do not provide NAS'.
Audit Tenure
Tenure is the number of years an auditor audits a client. Audit tenure is said to 
have an influence on auditor independence. A long tenure is said to have a negative 
effect on auditor independence as many, especially regulators, have the impression 
that the client can better influence his auditor in a longer auditor-client relationship 
as compared to a shorter relationship. An auditor is perceived to be inclined 
toward his client through the years as they become familiar to each other. Hence, 
longer audit tenure is viewed to be a threat on auditors' independence. On the 
other hand, a shorter tenure is perceived to be able to overcome the threat. As 
auditor-client relationship is new, the auditor is able to remain objective and will 
not adhere to a client's intervention. Thus, the auditor is said to be independent. 
Regulators believed that auditor rotation is a solution for auditors to remain 
independent. In the aftermath of the major corporate collapses, such as Enron and 
WorldCom, policymakers and regulators have expressed concerns over the lack of 
auditor independence that might have caused by audit firm tenure and its effects 
on audit quality. Mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) every several years was 
suggested as solution (PCAOB, 2011) to strengthen independence. The notion of 
MAFR stems from the perception that long auditor tenure and the comfortable 
relationship between auditor and client would threaten auditor independence and 
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decrease the auditing quality. Several Asian countries have adopted mandatory 
rotation.  Previous research conceptualized tenure differently. For example, 
Shockley (1981) conceptualized tenure as 'Long' or 'Short'. Recently conducted 
market based research defined audit tenure by the number of year of audit-client 
relationship. Carcello and Nagy (2004) and Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds 
(2002) specifically defined "short" to be less than three years and "long" to be 
more than nine years. In Malaysia, the length of audit tenure and the possible 
effects on auditor independence are still unclear and are not explicitly addressed in 
any of the relevant Malaysian official documents (Abdul Nasser, Wahid, Nazri, & 
Mohammad, 2006), though in the year 2002 the Chairman of the MASB then had 
announced the intention of the board to make it mandatory to rotate the audit firm 
once every five years (The Edge, 2002). The current study will define audit tenure 
as 'More than five years' and 'Less than five years'.
Audit Firm Size and the Auditor's Likelihood of Supporting an Audit 
Exemption for SMEs
Previous research has reported that audit firm size influences the auditor's 
independent judgement. Geiger and Rama (2006) observed a significant difference 
between clients that are audited by big-4 and non-big-4 audit firms with respect 
to bankruptcy filings after receiving a modified going concern report in the prior 
year. They found that the clients of big-4 firms file for bankruptcy less frequently 
and exhibit higher quality audit reports compared to those of non-big-4 firms. 
Amake and Okafor (2012) found that although audit firm size has a positive effect 
on auditors' independence, this relationship was not significant. Regarding the 
perspectives of accountants and auditors, Salehi and Mansoury (2008) revealed 
that 70% (126 participants) of those surveyed did not agree that firm size affects 
auditors' willingness to report biases. In other words, they believe that firm size 
has no significant effect on auditors' independence. 
In Malaysia, Sori, Mohamad, and Karbhari (2006), Abu Bakar and Ahmad (2009) 
and Salleh, et al. (2008b) found that audit firm size has a positive and significant 
effect on auditor independence. Regarding the perspectives of third parties such as 
bank loan officers, Abu Bakar, et al. (2005) also reported a positive relationship 
between firm size and the level of auditor independence.  Therefore, in our study 
on audit firm size and the likelihood that an auditor will support an audit exemption 
for SMEs, we hypothesis that:
H1: Large audit firm will lead to a greater likelihood of supporting the 
audit exemption.
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Non-audit Services and the Auditor's Likelihood of Supporting an Audit 
Exemption for SMEs
One factor associated with the downfall of Enron Corporation was that NAS were 
being offered in conjunction with audit services. As a result, US regulators passed 
a new law called the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The act prohibited auditors 
from providing NAS (except for taxation) in conjunction with audit services. In 
addition, the law requires that the fees charged for NAS must be disclosed in the 
clients' annual reports. In Malaysia, the MIA By-Law states that a "self-review 
threat" might be created if audit firms provide both audit and NAS to the same 
client.
Research conducted by Ahadiat (2011) on British and Australian audit clients 
concluded that providing non-audit services makes auditors less likely to issue a 
qualified opinion. Indirectly, this implies that providing NAS might impair auditor 
independence. In Malaysia, Abu Bakar and Ahmad (2009) and Abu Bakar, et al. 
(2005) found that accountants and bank loan officers agree that NAS have a 
significant effect on auditor independence. In addition, Hariri (2009) found that 
NAS fees have a positive relationship with the impairment of auditor independence. 
Thus the current study on NAS and the likelihood of an auditor supporting an audit 
exemption for SMEs hypothesis the following:
H2: Audit firms that provide non-audit services will have a greater 
likelihood of supporting the audit exemption.
Audit Tenure and the Auditor's Likelihood of Supporting an Audit Exemption 
for SMEs
Audit tenure has been studied in association with the collapse of large business 
empires such as Enron Corporation, WorldCom, etc. The duration of the auditor-
client relationship is perceived to influence the auditor's independence and 
judgement, especially regarding the auditor's opinion of the truth and fairness of 
the financial statements of client companies and in issuing the audit report. US 
regulators have recommended "audit rotation" to maintain auditor independence 
and reliable audit reports. This means that audit firms are not allowed to audit a 
client's company for an excessive period, as this may affect the auditor's judgement. 
A relationship that is too long can affect the quality of audit work. Rotation is 
suggested not only for the audit firm but also for the audit partner. In Malaysia, the 
MIA has proposed that an audit partner be rotated after having audited a client's 
company for five years (MIA, 2012). The effectiveness of this practice, however, 
remains unclear.
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Prior research has reported mixed evidence regarding audit tenure and auditor 
independence. Auditors tend to issue more qualified reports in the early period 
oftheir tenure with a client (and hence if not too long). For example, the qualified 
reports means that the auditor cannot give a true and fair view about the company's 
financial report or in other words, the auditors are unable to provide the opinion that 
the financial statement is correct. Meyer, Rigsby, and Boone (2007) and Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2002) found that a long audit tenure has a positive relationship with 
issuing more unqualified reports relative to a short audit tenure. However, Chiang 
and Lin (2012), in a study on Taiwan, found that audit tenure alone has no impact 
on the likelihood of an auditor issuing an unqualified report. This means that audit 
tenure is also influenced by other factors, such as the personal interests of auditors 
that combined with a long audit tenure will affect the auditors' independence in 
issuing an audit report. 
Amake and Okafor (2012) found that audit tenure has a positive but not significant 
relationship with auditor independence. The authors explain this lack of significance 
through the auditors' honouring the trust and commitment that they received from 
the client. Hariri (2009) found that audit tenure has no significant relationship with 
auditor independence, which contradicts Abu Bakar and Ahmad (2009)'s findings. 
The latter found that audit tenure has a negative relationship with an auditor's 
independence. Therefore, the current study on audit tenure and the likelihood that 
an auditor will support an audit exemption for SMEs hypothesises that:
H3: Short audit tenure will lead to a higher likelihood of supporting 
the audit exemption for SMEs.
RESEARCH METHOD
In this study, the analyses are conducted at the individual level, thus the unit of 
analysis is the individual auditor. The sample was chosen from the population 
firms registered as MIA members. Based on the information provided by the MIA, 
as of 2013 there were 1239 registered member firms that provide audit services. 
The data for this study was collected using questionnaires which consists of two 
parts. Part A consists of the background information about the respondents and part 
B consists of eight cases. The questionnaire for this study was developed by the 
researchers. A pre-test of the questionnaire was conducted using five auditors from 
the MIA list. The purpose of the pre-test is to ensure that the questionnaire is clear 
and suitable for respondents to answer. The respondents found the questionnaires to 
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be clear. The five respondents in the pre-test have been excluded for the empirical 
research in order to avoid any bias data.
A total of 600 questionnaires was distributed with self-addressed returned 
envelopes to randomly chosen audit firms from the list provided by MIA. Finally, 
79 usable responses were received which gave a 13% of response rate. According 
to Sekaran and Bougie (2010), the sample size has to be ranged between 30 to 500 
respondents to ensure that the analysis is acceptable and can be tested.
An experimental design is used to achieve the research aims of examining the 
"effect" of the three variables on the perceptions of auditors' independence. An 
experiment involves a researcher manipulating one or more variables to determine 
the effect of this manipulation on another variable (Kirk, 2013). In essence, the 
independent variables in this study will be tested at certain levels, namely the 
treatment levels, to determine their effects on the dependent variable. 
The current study assesses the effects of three independent variables, namely audit 
firm size, the provision of NAS and audit tenure, at two levels as shown in Table 
2. The study uses a 2 × 2 × 2 within- subjects design. Each respondent will have to 
evaluate eight scenarios (see Table 1) that manipulate the independent variables as 
described in Table 3. The hypothetical case involves an auditor auditing an SME 
with the following characteristics:
1. SME size
• Annual Turnover of between RM400,000 and RM500,000 with 5 
permanent employees.
2. Nature of business and industry
• Retail and services business
3. Other Characteristics commonly faced by SMEs
• No or improper segregation of duties
• Improper record keeping
• Lack of internal control and monitoring in inventory and the collection 
of sale proceeds
4. Other hypothetical scenario
• An auditor assigned to conduct audit faces the dilemma of whether 
to proceed with an audit of the SME
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In other words, a scenario in which a senior auditor faces a dilemma when auditing 
an SME based on certain SME characteristics will be introduced prior to the 
manipulation of the variables. The scenario portrays a dilemma faced by the 
senior auditor concerning internal control issues. In the experimental design, this 
acts as the control variable, establishing a uniform condition for the respondents 
to assume before proceeding to complete the set of questions posed in the 
questionnaire. Respondents are asked to assess the actions of the auditor based 
on the background of the company provided in paragraphs 1 and 2; the conflict 




Audit Tenure Firm Size NAS
> 5 years < 5 years > 5 employees < 5 employees Provides Does not provide
Case 1 × × ×
Case 2 × × ×
Case 3 × × ×
Case 4 × × ×
Case 5 × × ×
Case 6 × × ×
Case 7 × × ×
Case 8 × × ×
Table 3
Measurement of Independent Variables
Independent Variables   Treatment Levels
Audit Firm Size a. More than five employees
b. Fewer than five employees
Non-Audit Services a. Provides NAS
b. Does not provide NAS
Audit Tenure a. More than five years
b. Fewer than five years
Meanwhile, the dependent variable for this study is perceptions of auditors' 
independence. An auditor dilemma scenario was used to examine auditor 
independence, proxy by 'likelihood to agree for audit exemption on SMEs. 
Previous studies on auditor-client conflict have used a scenario to evaluate if an 
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auditor would accede or oppose a client's resolution such as Gul (1989, 1991); 
Knapp (1985) and Patel and Psaros (2000).




Elite Lightings Sdn Bhd (ELSB) is a family-owned Small and Medium 
Enterprise (SME) that specializes in home and commercial lighting design 
and services. ELSB is located in Raub, Pahang and has been in operation 
for the past 15 years. The firm's average annual turnover ranges between 
RM400,000.00 to RM500,000.00. Presently there are 5 permanent employees 
in the firm. 
The owners have little financial knowledge. In addition, due to the small 
number of employees, ELSB often faced difficulty in segregation of duties. 
Transaction records were kept but occasionally, several errors were detected by 
the manager upon inspection. The store clerks often find inventory review of 
stocks difficult due to improper inventory record. The manager believes items 
were taken out from the store for installation work but there were no proper 
record and monitoring of physical stocks by the employees. Collection of sales 
proceeds was slow at times due to the present manner of record keeping.
Mr Sam is a senior auditor in Ahmad & Associates. Mr Sam has been assigned 
to conduct the audit and taxation for ELSB this year. Mr Sam has read some 
articles pertaining to the topic of audit exemption of SMEs in the 2012 issue 
of Accountants Today. After going through the records of ELSB, Mr Sam is 
hesitant whether he should proceed with the audit.
Additional Information
Ahmad & Associates is an audit firm with a total number of more than 5 
employees.  Ahmad & Associates has been providing audit services to ELSB 
for more than 5 years. In addition to audit services, Ahmad & Associates also 
offer other non audit services besides taxation.
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Instruction:
Based on the scenario in the background and additional information above, 
please circle the most appropriate response to the questions below.
Question 1: 
In your opinion, how likely would Mr Sam proceed with the audit of Elite 
Lightings Sdn Bhd (ELSB)/ not exempt ELSB from being audited?
Very low 




Assume you are the auditor for Elite Lightings Sdn Bhd how likely would you 
proceed with the audit of the firm/ not exempt ELSB from being audited?
Very low 




The GLM (Repeat Measures) is used to test the hypotheses. The GLM (Repeat 
Measures) is a statistical tool in SPSS that is able to detect the effects of categorical 
independent variables on a continuous dependent variable. This includes detecting 
the main and interaction effects of independent variables on the dependent variable. 
An ANOVA was conducted to address the research questions.
A total of 79 useable questionnaires were considered in the analysis. The respondent 
profiles are summarised in Table 4. Regarding age, only 17.7% of the respondents 
are considered young, that is, less than 25 years old, while only slightly more than 
5% are above 55 years of age. Nearly half, 41.8%, of the respondents are between 
26 and 35 years old, and 70.9% of the respondents are in the 26–45 age category. 
Among the 79 respondents, 41.8% are male and 58.2% are female. Regarding the 
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current positions of the respondents, 46.1% are junior/senior auditors, 27.6% are 
audit managers, more than one-sixth (or 17.1%) and slightly less than one-tenth (or 




Age < 25 years old 14 17.7
26–35 years old 33 41.8
36–45 years old 23 29.1
46–55 years old 5 6.3
Above 55 years old 4 5.1
Gender Male 33 41.8
Female 46 58.2
Highest Education Diploma 1 1.3
Bachelor's Degree 35 44.3
Master's Degree 3 3.8
PhD/Doctorate 0 0.0
Professional Qualification 39 49.4
Other Qualification 1 1.3
Professional Certificates MICPA 7 8.9
CIMA 1 1.3
CPA (Australia) 8 10.1
ACCA 23 29.1
Others 4 5.1
Not Applicable 36 45.6
Current Position Junior/Senior 35 46.1
Audit Supervisor 7 9.2
Audit Manager 21 27.6
Partner 13 17.1
A large proportion (49.4%) of the respondents have a professional qualification, 
while a similar percentage (44.3%) holds a Bachelor's degree. While none of the 
respondents have SPM/STPM qualification and only one has a Diploma, none of the 
respondents are PhD/Doctorate holders. Among the professional certifications that 
the respondents possess, the plurality (29.1%) of the respondents have an ACCA 
qualification, 10.1% and 8.9% of the respondents have CPA (Australia) and MICPA 
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qualifications respectively, and only one respondent has a CIMA certificate. The 
reason why there is a low number of auditors with a low professional qualification 
is due to the fact that in Malaysia, one of the pathways to be an auditor is to have a 
Bachelor of Accounting degree by an approved institution accredited by MIA and 
possess three years relevant working experience. Nearly half of respondents have 
taken this route. Furthermore, most of the respondents are from the senior group 




Means of different scenarios
Case Scenarios Mean 
1 <5 firm employees, <5 tenure years, do not offer NAS 4.02
2 <5 firm employees, <5 tenure years, offer NAS 4.22
3 <5 firm employees, >5 tenure years, do not offer NAS 4.21
4 <5 firm employees, >5 tenure years, offer NAS 4.17
5 >5 firm employees, <5 tenure years, do not offer NAS 4.39
6 >5 firm employees, <5 tenure years, offer NAS 4.46
7 >5 firm employees, >5 tenure years, do not offer NAS 4.48
8 >5 firm employees, >5 tenure years, offer NAS 4.54
Table 5 presents the mean likelihood of supporting an audit exemption for each of 
the eight scenarios. From the tabulated values, the highest likelihood of supporting 
an audit exemption is exhibited in case 8 (mean of 4.544), where the scenario 
includes large firm size, long audit tenure and firms that offer NAS. The lowest 
likelihood is exhibited in case 1 (mean of 4.019), where the scenario is the opposite 
of that in case 8, namely, small firm size, short audit tenure and firms that do not 
offer non-audit services. By examining the differences in mean likelihood (taking 
case 8 as the reference), case 4 (mean of 4.171), featuring small firm size, has the 
largest mean difference with case 8, followed by case 6 (mean of 4.456), featuring 
short audit tenure, and case 7 (mean of 4.475), which concerns firms that do not 
offer non-audit services. This finding suggests that firm size is the most important 
among the three factors considered in influencing the likelihood of supporting an 
audit exemption. The small difference in the mean between cases 8 and 6 and 
between cases 8 and 7 suggests that the length of audit tenure and firm provision 
of NAS may not be important factors influencing the likelihood of supporting an 
audit exemption.
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Comparison of the Independent Variables
Another initial method of analysis that can be employed to determine the possible 
influence of certain factors on the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption is 
a 2-sample t-test. However, note that for each respondent, the eight scenarios are 
dependent as four scenarios relate to small firms and the remaining four scenarios 
relate to large firms. Because all statistical tests, including a paired t-test, require 
independent samples, the likelihoods obtained in the four scenarios involving 
small firms and those involving large firms are averaged. A similar procedure is 
conducted when testing mean differences in likelihoods for firms with different 
lengths of audit tenure and the mean differences in the likelihoods for firms with 
different NAS provision.
Table 6
Paired t-test, factors vs. likelihood
Pairs n Mean Mean difference t df p-value
Pair 1 Small Firm 79 4.155 –0.312 –4.35 78 ***0.000
Large Firm 79 4.467
Pair 2 Short Tenure 79 4.272 –0.078 –0.75 78 0.454
Long Tenure 79 4.350
Pair 3 Offers NAS 79 4.348 0.074 1.30 78 0.197
Does Not Offer NAS 79 4.274
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
From Table 6, the means of the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption do 
not appear to differ substantially between small and large firms (4.155 and 4.467, 
respectively). However, and surprisingly, the paired t-test yields a significant result 
at the 5% level (t-statistic of –4.35 with  a  corresponding  p-value  of  0.000), 
indicating  that  the  two  means  are  statistically different. Here, the results imply 
that the likelihood that auditors at large firms will support an audit exemption is 
significantly higher than the likelihood that auditors at small firms will do so. In 
brief, firm size affects the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption. 
Similarly, the means of the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption do not 
appear to differ substantially between firms with a short audit tenure and firms 
with a long audit tenure (4.272 and 4.350, respectively). Unsurprisingly, the paired 
t-test does not yield a significant result (t-statistic of –0.75 with a corresponding 
p-value of 0.454), indicating the two means are not statistically different. Thus, 
the results imply that the likelihood that auditors at firms with a short audit tenure 
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and those at firms with a long audit tenure will support an audit exemption can be 
regarded as the same. At this stage, the length of audit tenure cannot be considered 
a factor affecting the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption. 
Regarding firm provision of NAS, the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption 
does not appear to substantially differ between firms with respect to whether they 
offer NAS (4.348 and 4.274 for firms that offer and do not offer NAS, respectively). 
The result of the paired t-test (t-statistic of 1.30 with a corresponding p-value of 
0.197) supports this observation, implying that auditors from these two types of 
firms have the same likelihood of supporting an exemption. In brief, firm provision 
of NAS is also not a factor in determining auditor support for an audit exemption.
Hypothesis Testing
Table 7
Multivariate main effect of firm size, non-audit services and audit tenure on 
an auditor's support for an audit exemption
Source F df p-value Partial Eta Squared
Firm Size 23.05 1 ***0.000 0.230
Non-audit Services 0.38 1 0.539 0.005
Audit Tenure 0.46 1 0.498 0.006
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Regarding the tabulated values in Table 7, the F-statistic (23.05) and the 
corresponding significance level (p-value) of 0.000 suggests that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the likelihood of supporting an audit 
exemption among auditors at large firms (more than five employees) and that for 
auditors at small firms (fewer than five employees). Despite the significance of audit 
firm size as a factor determining support for an audit exemption, the magnitude of 
partial eta squared is rather small (0.230), indicating that the strength of association 
between firm size and the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption is relatively 
weak. 
Meanwhile, regarding firm provision of NAS, the F statistic of 0.38 with a 
corresponding p-value of 0.539 suggests that the null hypothesis of H3 stating that 
firm provision of NAS does not influence the likelihood of supporting an audit 
exemption cannot be rejected. This implies that there is no evidence to support 
the hypothesis that firm provision of NAS influencing the likelihood of supporting 
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an audit exemption. The insignificance of the main effect of the firm provision of 
NAS is supported by the very small magnitude of partial eta squared of 0.005. 
However, regarding the length of audit tenure as the main effect, the F statistic 
of 0.46 with a corresponding p-value of 0.498 indicates that the null hypothesis 
of H2 stating that audit tenure does not influence the likelihood of supporting an 
audit exemption cannot be rejected. This finding implies that there is no sufficient 
evidence to support the claim that the length of audit tenure is a significant factor 
influencing the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption. The result suggests 
the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption when the length of audit tenure 
is less than five years (short audit tenure) is not statistically significantly different 
from the likelihood of supporting an audit exemption when the length of audit 
tenure is more than five years (long audit tenure). The insignificance of length of 
audit tenure as a determinant of support for an audit exemption is further supported 
by the very small magnitude of the partial eta squared of 0.006, indicating that the 
association between the length of audit tenure and the likelihood of supporting an 
audit exemption is very weak.
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
H1 was supported at the 5% significance level. Therefore, the study concludes 
that working at a large audit firm will lead to a higher likelihood of supporting 
an audit exemption compared to an individual at a smaller audit firm. This is 
consistent with the findings reported by Abu Bakar and Ahmad (2009); Amake 
and Okafor (2012) and Shockley (1981). The larger the firm size is, the greater the 
tendency to support an audit exemption. This could be because larger audit firms 
have the resources to provide NAS and have greater opportunities to provide audit 
services and NAS to other audit firms than do small audit firms. This is generally 
the argument advanced for why SMPs do not support an audit exemption, as they 
are of the opinion that it would adversely affect their revenue. The paired t-tests 
revealed that there is a significant difference between auditors from small and large 
audit firms in this respect. 
The study found that working at firms that provide NAS does not affect the 
likelihood of supporting an audit exemption. Thus H2 is rejected. This is consistent 
with the findings of Goldman and Barlev (1975), who suggested that providing 
NAS would increase the auditor's independence, as most NAS are non-routine 
and that the auditor would directly benefit the client firm when conducting his 
audit work. Thus, it would not be an issue to simultaneously provide NAS and 
an audit. However findings by Abu Bakar and Ahmad (2009); Hariri (2009) and 
Audit Exemption for Small and Medium Enterprises
177
Shockley (1981) indicated a significant relationship between NAS and auditor 
independence. They concluded that simultaneously providing NAS and an audit 
impair the auditor's independence. The different findings in this regard in the 
present study may result from the different measurement methods employed. 
The professional independence of an auditor in Malaysia is considered to be 
impaired if the total fees arising from providing NAS to a client represent 20% 
or more of the audit firm's total annual fees for two or more consecutive years 
(Ahmad, Shafie, & Yusof, 2006). However the MIA By-Law does not state a 
maximum limit for NAS received from a single client. This could be because the 
MIA is of the opinion that there is no conflict between offering NAS and an audit. 
In practice, audits and NAS services are offered by different divisions of the audit 
firms and are headed by different auditors, and thus audit firms might be of the 
opinion that providing both types of services would not impair their independence. 
Paired t-tests indicated that there is no significant difference between firms that 
provide and do not provide NAS. Furthermore, auditors will charge lower non-
audit fees if the firm provides audit services and NAS to the same client (Craswell 
& Guest, 2000). 
The study found that audit tenure does not have an effect on the likelihood that an 
auditor will support an audit exemption for SMEs. Thus, H3 was rejected. This 
could be because audit firms with a short audit tenure have yet to establish a good 
relationship with the SME client company and are not familiar with the SME's 
systems and problems. Such audit firms would like to better understand the SME 
client company and realise that auditing services could represent an additional 
source of revenue for their companies. This also implies that a short audit tenure 
does not necessarily mean that the audit firm is more independent. The findings of 
this study are consistent with those of previous studies reporting that audit tenure 
does not affect auditor independence. Through paired t-tests, the present study 
found that there is no significant difference between a short and long audit tenure. 
This is consistent with Hariri (2009) and Carcello and Nagy (2004). However, in 
contrast, Abu Bakar and Ahmad (2009) and Meyer et al. (2007) found that a long 
audit tenure will improve audit quality and improve auditor independence. The 
difference between these findings could be due to the different research designs 
employed in conducting the studies. This study adapted an experimental design 
which focus on the cause and effect relationship by manipulating the factors while 
past studies utilised a correlational study. 
Auditing standards require that the auditors of a given client company be rotated 
every five years (MIA By-Law section 290: Independence and audit review and 
engagement). However, as found by Mohamed, Ismail, Nazri, and Hariri (2007), 
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this is not followed in practice—companies in Malaysia tend to retain their 
auditors for more than five years. The findings of the study accord with those of 
Shockley (1981) and Teoh and Lim (1996), who reported that tenure did not impair 
independence. In practice, a single auditor continues to perform audit services but 
rotates auditors after five years. In Malaysia, although there is no mandatory audit 
firm rotation, there is mandatory audit partner rotation which requires that partners 
rotate every five years when auditing PLCs and public interest entities (MIA, 2012; 
Siregar, Fitriany Amarullah, Wibowo, & Anggraita, 2012). 
In summary, only the size of the audit firm was found to affect the likelihood that 
an auditor supports an audit exemption for SMEs. The results of this study do not 
support the hypotheses that NAS and audit tenure affect an auditor's likelihood of 
supporting an audit exemption. This indicates that small audit firms do not support 
an audit exemption for SMEs because they might believe that this represents their 
main source of revenue. It is also possible that such audit firms lack the necessary 
skills, knowledge and competencies to devote greater attention and focus to non-
audit services, such as consultancy and taxation (Haron, et al., 2010).
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This study found that large audit firms tend to support an audit exemption for 
SMEs and that small audit firms hold the opposite opinion. This could be because 
small audit firms lack the necessary skills, knowledge and competencies to offer 
non-audit services. Some of the explanations cited in the past literature include 
a lack of resources to train staff. If this is the issue, a possible remedy would be 
for the MIA to recommend that small audit firms merge or expand their capacity 
by increasing the size of their staff. For example, audit firms could collaborate 
with legal firms, and when a client requests legal work, the small audit firm could 
channel the work to legal experts working for their audit firm. There could also 
be a consortium or a network of small audit firms which would "pass on" work 
to other members in the consortium if the service requested is not available in a 
particular audit firm. 
Although issue of audit exemption has been the subject of much debate in the 
literature, there is little empirical evidence on the issue. As the issue of this study 
had examine using an experimental design which is different from past studies, it 
is able to enhance the knowledge of scholars and provide the empirically evidence 
in the field of study. 
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As in other research, this study has limitations. The principal limitation of the 
study is its small sample size which might be attributable to the length of the 
questionnaire. Although the sample size in the study was 79, this is sufficient to 
meet the study's objectives (according to Roscoe's rule of thumb), but ideally, a 
larger sample size would have been obtained. The sample also includes big-four 
firms, but in reality, firms outside of the big four typically audit SMEs. However, 
the proportion of large firms is quite small in this study. Nevertheless, this is 
acceptable, as this study merely aimed to examine the perceptions of all auditors 
with respect to the issue of audit exemption.  Future studies could only include 
small audit firms and conduct interviews to obtain more detailed reasons that such 
firms do not support an audit exemption.
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